Journal of Experimental Social Psychology / The power of we : evidence for group-based control by Fritsche, Immo et al.
Running head: Group-Based Control 
 
The Power of We: Evidence for Group-Based Control  
Immo Fritsche1&2 
Universität Leipzig, Germany 
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany 
Eva Jonas3  
Paris-Lodron-Universität Salzburg, Austria 
Catharina Ablasser3 
Paris-Lodron-Universität Salzburg, Austria 
Magdalena Beyer2 
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany 
Johannes Kuban1&2 
Universität Leipzig, Germany 
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany 
Anna-Marie Manger2 
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany 
Marlene Schultz2 
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany 
 
Accepted for publication in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
 
1Dept. of Social Psychology, University of Leipzig, Seeburgstr. 14-20, D-04103 Leipzig, 
Germany 
2Dept. of Social Psychology, University of Jena, Humboldtstr. 26, D-07743 Jena, Germany 
Group-Based Control 
 
2
3Dept. of Social Psychology, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstr. 34, 5020 Salzburg, 
Austria.  
 
Keywords: social motivation, ingroup as a resource, need for control, threat, intergroup 
behavior 
Group-Based Control 
 
3
Abstract 
Membership in social groups may restore people’s sense of global control when 
personal control is questioned. Therefore, ethnocentric tendencies might be increased as a 
consequence of personal control threat. Testing hypotheses derived from a novel model of 
group-based control in five experiments, we show that making lack of personal control salient 
increased ingroup bias and pro-organizational behavior (Studies 1 - 5). These effects were 
independent of parallel effects of uncertainty (Study 2) and most pronounced for highly 
identified group members (Study 3). Studies 4 and 5 lend support to the assumption that 
perceiving the ingroup as a unitary actor is critical for symbolic control restoration: Threat to 
collective homogeneity and agency catalyzed the effect personal control threat had on ingroup 
support and defense. These findings complement previous research on motivated intergroup 
behavior and socio-cognitive strategies to cope with deficits in personal control.   
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The Power of We: Evidence for Group-Based Control 
Humans are both helpless and almighty. They are at the mercy of fate and nature, as 
most individual outcomes and achievements are dependent on external forces. They are not 
able to protect themselves from strokes of fate, such as losing a partner, becoming 
unemployed, suffering chronic disease, or even their own death. On the other hand, humans 
have great potential. People have the ability to mentally move through space and time, to 
generate goals of high ambition and to pursue them in a coordinated manner. Humans have 
the potential to travel the moon, to sustain a global civilization, and even to understand their 
own psyche. These enormous abilities are reflected in – and perhaps also catalyzed by – 
people’s exaggerated beliefs of being in control over their physical, mental, and social 
environment (e.g., Langer, 1975). However, this basic sense of global control that imbues 
people’s thinking in everyday life can be deeply shaken when people reflect on their 
insufficiencies to ultimately control the very basic conditions of their life, such as social 
inclusion, physical health, or their very existence.  
People may try to prevent threats to implicit beliefs in personal control by turning to 
one of the most important sources of human potency: the group. Humans were able to 
conquer the world due to their capacity to form shared intentionality and meaningful social 
groups and institutions (e.g., Tomasello, 2009). The ability to think in terms of “we” instead 
of “I” has opened the door to collective efficacy and unique collective achievements, such as 
the creation of great buildings like the Great Wall of China or medieval cathedrals which 
needed generations of builders to come into existence. Many researchers maintain that it is an 
individual’s position within the group that determines her or his evolutionary fitness rather 
than her or his ability to directly interact with nature (e.g., Brewer & Caporael, 2006) and 
some authors have defined power and control as an individual’s ability to recruit collective 
agency in the service of her or his own agenda (Simon & Oakes, 2006; Turner, 2005). 
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In the present article, we test hypotheses derived from a novel model of group-based 
control, stating that people may uphold their basic sense of global control through 
highlighting group membership and acting as a group member. Specifically, in times when 
people reflect on the ultimate boundaries of their personal control over important aspects of 
their life, group membership might become crucial. Then, people may tend to prefer 
definitions of the self in terms of “we” instead of “I” and act as a group member instead of 
acting as an individual person. As a result, threat to personal control may increase 
ethnocentric tendencies in people, such as ingroup support and favoritism and – at times – 
outgroup derogation. We will outline the model in more detail and present a set of five studies 
conducted to provide first evidence for processes of group-based control restoration to occur.  
Control Motivation 
People have a basic desire to perceive important events in their environment as 
contingent on the will and actions of their self (e.g., Pittman & Zeigler, 2007; Skinner, 1996; 
White, 1959). In addition, the ideal of agency (to be an agent instead of an object) seems to 
guide the way in which people construe their self (Preston & Wegner, 2005). Empirical 
evidence for the importance of control perceptions comes from research showing that people 
often experience illusions of control in objectively uncontrollable situations such as when 
drawing lottery tickets (Langer, 1975). Furthermore, perceptions of control and autonomy 
seem to be essential for human functioning and equanimity as they have been found to 
increase variables such as well-being, performance, positive emotions and self-esteem (for an 
overview see Skinner, 1996). Perceptions of lacking control in turn increase anxiety and 
depression (Skinner, 1996). 
People are not only motivated to have control in specific situations but also desire a 
sense of global control generalized over self-relevant events and outcomes (Thompson, 1993). 
If objective control is restricted individuals might try to re-establish control either in primary 
or in secondary ways (Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 1982). Individuals striving for primary 
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control seek to control the desired outcomes themselves. Secondary control strivings are 
described as more indirect means of (re-) gaining a sense of control (Skinner, 2007). For 
example, in processes of vicarious control (Rothbaum et al., 1982) people affiliate with 
powerful others who are assumed to influence outcomes in the desired direction. We propose 
self-definition as a group member to be an alternative way to restore or maintain perceptions 
of global control, as here control is exerted through the (social) self and not by others. 
Groups and the Restoration of Control 
In research on social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization (Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) it has been demonstrated that group memberships 
serve people to define their self. That is, group attributes and actions may become attributes 
and actions of the self when people identify with a social group (self-stereotyping; Hogg & 
Turner, 1987). The social identity approach has emphasized the desire for positive evaluation 
of the self laying the ground for ingroup identification and ingroup bias. However, recently, 
some authors have argued that social identity is also related to power and control (Simon & 
Oakes, 2006; Turner, 2005). These authors stress that “a person or group has power insofar as 
it recruits human agency in the service of its agenda” (Simon & Oakes, 2006; p. 113). Turner 
(2005) argues that shared social identities lay the unique foundation of exerting control 
through others as this kind of power “only emerges from human social relationships, from the 
capacity of people to organize themselves into groups, institutions, and societies.” (p. 6).  
In contrast to interdependence approaches to group formation (e.g., Sherif, 1966), 
Turner (2005) and Simon and Oakes (2006) propose that it is not realistic dependency which 
determines group formation and group life. They rather suggest that existing social identities 
lay the ground for mutual influence among people which in turn leads to the emergence of 
power and resource control through others. We may add that although group formation might 
sometimes occur along the lines of shared realistic interests and mutual positive 
interdependence  (Sherif, 1966), realistic interdependence is not sufficient to explain why 
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group membership should have the capacity to restore and maintain a subjective sense of 
global control. This is because receiving support from others within the group might be a 
double-edged sword if people want to perceive the self (and not others) as having control. 
This is why we think that social identity rather than mere group membership should be critical 
for group-based control restoration. Specifically, we propose that people who perceive low 
personal control may prefer to define their self via the ingroup and act as an ingroup member 
because this might maintain perceptions of power and control exerted through the (social) 
self.  
There is preliminary evidence for processes of group-based control restoration to 
occur through the enactment of social identity. Guinote, Brown, and Fiske (2006) 
demonstrated that social identity as a group member influences individuals’ perceptions of 
control. People who were made to believe that they belonged to a majority group in society 
anticipated more control in a following group discussion task than those who believed they 
were part of a minority group. Given the impact of group membership on perceptions of 
control, people should be motivated to perceive their group as having control. Accordingly, 
Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, and Scabini (2006) conclude that control motivation is 
one of various distinct motives that determine identity construction on the individual as well 
as the group level of the self. The tendency to perceive the ingroup as a unitary actor is also 
evident in research on group entitativity. Here, social categories are perceived as groups or 
“real” entities when these can be ascribed both homogeneity and agency (Brewer, Hong & Li, 
2004).  
Motivational Explanations of Intergroup Behavior 
In the intergroup literature control motivation has been largely ignored as an 
independent source of intergroup and ethnocentric behavior. Instead, related, but conceptually 
distinct, motives have received considerable attention (for an overview see, for instance, 
Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002). Uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg, 2007) maintains that 
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defining the self in terms of the ingroup may reduce uncertainty about the self as people can 
infer characteristics of the self from the ingroup stereotype (self-stereotyping). Findings that 
ingroup bias is increased under conditions of personal uncertainty (e.g., Grieve & Hogg, 
1999) support this approach (for related positions see Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti & De 
Grada, 2006; van den Bos, 2009).  
In a different influential line of research, Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski (1997; 
see also Castano & Dechesne, 2005) have proposed ingroup bias to be rooted in the self-
preservation motive. According to terror management theory, defining the self as a group 
member means to define the self via a death-transcendent entity which is assumed to buffer 
the potential terror elicited by the awareness of human mortality (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino 
& Sacchi, 2002). In addition, ingroup favouritism has been argued to indicate people’s efforts 
to validate death-transcendent cultural worldviews that – together with personal self-esteem – 
give people a sense of symbolic immortality (Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon & Simon, 
1996). A host of evidence that people exhibit more ingroup bias after having been induced to 
think about their personal death (e.g., Castano et al., 2002; Giannakakis & Fritsche, 2011; 
Harmon-Jones et al., 1996) seems to support the terror management approach.  
Recently, Fritsche, Jonas, and Fankhänel (2008) advocated an alternative explanation 
of mortality salience effects in terms of control restoration. Death is one of the most clear-cut 
metaphors for a global lack of personal control, and therefore, reactions to death salience 
might basically represent processes of control restoration rather than self-preservation. In line 
with this notion, the authors found that a classical death salience treatment increased implicit 
control motivation. In addition, effects of mortality salience were eliminated when people 
were reminded of partial control over their own death (self-determined death or suicide 
salient) and an orthogonal manipulation of death salience and control salience revealed only 
an effect of control salience on support for a preferred political party. Processes of group-
based control may explain these findings.  
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The increasing interest in social behavior responses to control threat is also expressed 
in work by Kay and colleagues (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan & Laurin, 2008; see also Kay, 
Whitson, Gaucher & Galinsky, 2009; Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, Chua & Galinsky, 2010) who 
demonstrated that reminding people of lacking control over positive events increased the 
justification of the political and economic system of people’s own country and the belief in a 
controlling God. Rutjens and Loseman (2010) conceptually replicated the former finding by 
showing that the induction of low self-control capacity also increased tendencies toward 
system justification. As an explanation of their findings these authors suggest that people need 
to shield themselves from the idea that the world is an unpredictable and chaotic place which 
might be elicited by perceptions of low personal control. Therefore, the belief in powerful 
agents of control (e.g., God) or that the world is just may compensate for lacking control 
through the self.  
We concur that a lack of personal control may elicit efforts to increase a sense of 
predictability and certainty (Kay et al., 2008, 2009, 2010; Rothbaum et al., 1982; Van den 
Bos, 2001). However, we think that people’s foremost concern under conditions of control 
threat is to establish that the world is controlled by their self and not by some external agent. 
That is, from the perspective of the group-based control account, and in line with previous 
findings by Fritsche et al. (2008) after threat to personal control people should be most 
inclined to support and defend the personal or the social self (i.e., the social ingroup). Systems 
might be supported most if they are the system of the ingroup (e.g., the political system of 
one’s own state or culture, for example the US) but less so if they characterize the outgroup 
(e.g., the traditional political system of a different state or culture, for example China).  
A Model of Group-Based Control 
We unite previously disparate findings in one cogent framework – a model of group-
based control. It provides a novel account of motivated collective behaviour and of the role 
group membership plays in restoring or maintaining perceived control when a global sense of 
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control is threatened. At the core of this model lies the assumption that people think and act in 
terms of group membership as an attempt to restore or maintain a sense of global control 
through the self. Defining the self in terms of a social ingroup can serve the restoration of a 
global sense of control as people heuristically think of groups as actors (Brewer et al., 2004). 
Specifically, groups should be perceived as agents who act in line with goals and values 
(agency) that are shared among group members (homogeneity)1. Therefore, we assume that 
people are inclined to think and act as group members or in terms of “we” instead of “I”, in 
response to limitations of their personal control. This may restore a global sense of control 
through the (social) self.   
Some specific predictions that can be derived from a model of group-based control are 
displayed in Figure 1. Path (a) illustrates that as a reaction to threats to their global sense of 
control people are assumed to behave in a manner that supports or defends the ingroup. 
However, collective responses to control threats are assumed to depend on self-categorization 
and identification as a group member (Path b) which should be determined by both the actual 
social context and a person’s individual readiness to adopt a specific social identity (see 
Bruner, 1957). Although threat to control may increase the initial readiness to identify with 
social ingroups and may elicit an active search for “available” social identities, it should be 
the case that collective reactions to lacking control occur when group membership is already 
salient in a situation (e.g., people who enter a football stadium and find themselves as a 
supporter of one of the two teams) or people already identify with a specific group (e.g., the 
home team).  
Path (c) directs attention to collective threat as a second moderating variable. 
Collective threat has been shown to increase ethnocentric behaviour such as ingroup bias and 
prejudice (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999; Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006). 
We propose that threats to ingroup homogeneity and agency can facilitate the effects of threat 
                                                
1
 Note that according to this definition actual success in goal attainment is not necessary for ascribing agency to 
a group, although, it might be one of its most prominent indicators. 
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to personal control on ethnocentric reactions in people highly identified with their ingroup. 
This is because ingroup homogeneity and agency form the bases of collective control and 
therefore constitute the basic conditions for group membership to restore a sense of global 
control. Thus, people who feel both low personal control as well as low ingroup homogeneity 
and agency may appraise this situation as double threat. This should result in particularly 
intense reactions of ingroup support and defense which might serve to re-establish collective 
control, at least in a symbolic sense2.  
The Present Research 
The present research has been set up to test some predictions derived from the model 
of group-based control. Specifically, we tested the hypotheses (a) that reminding people of 
low personal control increases ingroup bias and ingroup support and that this effect is 
exaggerated (b) for people who are highly identified with the ingroup, and (c) when ingroup 
homogeneity and agency are threatened. We also intended to empirically distinguish the 
effects of control threat from possibly related effects of self-concept uncertainty.  
First we will present two related experiments (Studies 1 and 2) testing the impact of 
control salience on ingroup bias (Path a). To manipulate control salience we reminded 
participants of the possibility of becoming unemployed and varied the degree of perceived 
control over becoming unemployed or not. In Study 2 we added an orthogonal manipulation 
of uncertainty/certainty salience to test whether threat to control effects are independent of the 
effects of uncertainty. This study also explored the role that perceived intergroup cooperation 
plays for control salience effects on ingroup bias to occur. 
In Study 3 we tested the hypothesis that lack of control salience increases ingroup bias 
only for those people who are highly identified with their ingroup (Path b). Here, we used a 
straightforward manipulation of control salience, asking participants either to describe those 
                                                
2
 Note, that double threat to both personal and collective control may also lead to decreased ingroup defense or 
neutral responses when people are lowly identified with their ingroup and alternative social identities are 
available (Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, De Vries & Wilke, 1988; Spears, Doosje & Ellemers, 1997).   
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aspects of their lives that made them feel in control or those that made them feel not in 
control. We measured both national ingroup identification and ingroup bias in relation to two 
national outgroups.  
Studies 4 and 5 investigated the role of collective threat to ingroup homogeneity and 
agency for moderating the effects of control salience on ingroup bias and ingroup support 
(Path c). In these studies we manipulated not only personal but also collective threat to 
control. As a manipulation of collective threat, we used false feedback about the homogeneity 
of an artificially created ingroup in Study 4 and manipulated the salience of high or low 
global agency of a natural ingroup in Study 5.    
Study 1 
In Study 1 we investigated the basic effect of global control perceptions on ingroup 
bias, proposed in the model of group-based control (see Figure 1, Path a). One major threat to 
general control is facing long-term unemployment (e.g., Layton, 1987). This might refer both 
to being unemployed, which should result in restrictions of control in various areas of life, as 
well as realizing that one has far less than full control over becoming unemployed or not. At 
the time our studies took place, unintentional long-term unemployment was a major topic in 
public discourse and was perceived as one of the major threats in German society (Bulmahn, 
2004). Hence, we used an unemployment scenario to induce lack of control salience. To keep 
as many features of the situation constant as possible we varied the degree of control one has 
over becoming long-term unemployed. As a dependent variable we used an ingroup bias 
measure in which we asked our East and West German participants to rate both groups on 
positive and negative attributes.    
Method 
Participants and Design. Fourteen women and 13 men with an average age of 24.04 
(SD = 4.11) participated in our questionnaire study on the campus of an East German 
university in September 2004, receiving as compensation EUR 3. Twenty-two participants 
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were born in East Germany and three in West Germany. Two participants were born outside 
Germany but one had lived in East Germany since the age of one and the other was of 
German ethnicity and had lived in East Germany for 12 years. We included both participants 
as East Germans. One participant who refused to fill out the adjective ratings was excluded 
from the final sample. The resulting sample comprised of 23 East and three West Germans. 
The study had a one-factorial design (no control salient/ control salient) with ingroup 
bias in evaluations of East and West Germans as dependent variable.   
Procedure and Materials. Participants were told that the experimenters were interested 
in social information processing and the effects of perspective-taking on text recognition. In 
the first task they were asked to take the perspective of the protagonist in a case report from a 
large German newspaper. Specifically, they were asked to “imagine most precisely what the 
person thinks and feels in the described situation.” It was announced that later on they would 
have to answer some recognition questions. As the case report was designed to elicit the 
salience of self-relevant threat to control the protagonist and her life situation generally 
matched the characteristics of a young student population3. All participants read an article 
about a well-qualified female academic named Maren Maurer who suffered from long-term 
unemployment. After describing her experiences the text reported on the increasing number of 
unemployed academics in general.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two versions of the case report. In the 
no control salient condition the article was titled “Unemployed Academics: Time of Insults” 
and the first paragraph of the article stated that Maren Maurer had been fired when her 
company was closed two years ago. In the control salient condition the heading was 
“Unemployed Academics: Decisions with Far-Reaching Consequences” and Maren Maurer 
found herself long-term unemployed after she had quit her job to take time out in order to 
think about what she wanted from life. In both conditions, failing to find employment again 
                                                
3
 Although gender of the target person and participant were not matched, participant gender had no effect on our 
dependent variables. We conclude that the perspective-taking task worked for both men and women.  
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was described as being basically aversive and unintended. Therefore, conditions differed only 
with regard to why Maren Maurer initially lost her last job but not with regard to experiencing 
failure.  
The reading task was followed by the German version of the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988; Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann & 
Tausch, 1996), measuring positive (α = .86) and negative (α = .89) mood on ten five-point 
rating items (from 1 = “not at all” to 5 = “absolutely”). As mood values were not affected by 
the manipulation, all ps > .60, we did not include mood in the analyses.  
To check for the impact of the manipulation the participants answered some questions 
about the previous text, including (1) “To what extent are external circumstances (e.g., 
economic situation etc.) responsible for Maren Maurer’s current situation?” (reversed), (2) 
“To what extent is Maren Maurer responsible for her current situation?”, (3) “To what extent 
has Maren Maurer decided on her current situation?“, (4) “To what extent is Maren Maurer 
the master of her own fate?” All ratings were made on ten-point scales from “not at all” (1) to 
“very much” (10), α = .66.  
Following a filler questionnaire on sleeping and wakening patterns4, we told our 
participants that we were now interested in their personal judgments and perceptions in 
different areas. To increase their willingness to judge East and West Germans we first 
provided a warm-up attribute-rating task where we asked the participants to indicate to what 
extent members of different professional groups (office administrators, hair-dressers, police 
officers, nurses) were characterized by each of four different positive and negative attributes. 
Following this warm-up task we asked participants to rate 32 attributes on how well they 
described East and West Germans on ten-point scales from “not at all” (1) to “very much” 
(10). Order of target groups was counterbalanced. To increase participants’ readiness to make 
                                                
4
 We added the filler questionnaire as other research indicates that the effects of self-threats are most pronounced 
after a delay (Arndt, Cook & Routledge, 2004; Wichman, Brunner & Weary, 2008). 
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generalized judgments across group members and to differentiate between groups the 
adjectives had been chosen from a pool of pre-tested adjectives to represent attributes that are 
stereotypical for East Germans (e.g., helpful, uncertain) or West Germans (e.g., eloquent, 
know-all) which were added to other attributes that were not relevant to either stereotype 
(e.g., appreciative, stupid). We computed a composite ingroup bias score by recoding negative 
ingroup and positive outgroup attribute ratings for both East and West German participants 
separately and then computing the mean, α = .805. 
The remaining questions collected socio-demographic information. Following these, 
participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.   
Results 
As exploratory analyses indicated that participants in the no control salient condition 
tended to be older than those in the control salient condition (M = 25.73; SD = 5.06 vs. M = 
22.88; SD = 2.94), F(1,25) = 3.44; p < .08, we entered this variable as a covariate in all of the 
following analyses to make sure that the hypothesized effects of control salience were not due 
to age differences. As there was no effect involving order of presentation of East and West 
German descriptions we skipped this factor from the analyses. We excluded one outlier 
(studentized residual < -2.5 for ingroup bias) from the analyses. 
Manipulation Check. We calculated a one-factorial ANCOVA with control salience as 
a factor and age as covariate on amount of control ascribed to Maren Maurer. There was a 
significant main effect of the manipulation, which revealed decreased perceptions of control 
in the no control salient condition (M = 3.48; SE = 0.59; n = 9) compared to the control salient 
(M = 5.73; SE = 0.43; n = 16) condition, F(1, 22) = 8.48, p = .008, η2 = .28. This speaks for 
the success of our manipulation.  
                                                
5
 We collapsed ingroup/outgroup ratings across East and West German participants as we did not expect any 
systematic differences in effects due to participant group. Unfortunately, low numbers of West Germans in the 
present sample did not allow for a test of this underlying assumption.  
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Main Analysis. We submitted the ingroup bias scores to a 2 (no control/control salient) 
x 2 (ingroup bias on ingroup ratings/on outgroup ratings) ANCOVA with repeated measures 
on the second factor and age as covariate. As predicted, we found an effect of control salience 
on ingroup bias, F(1, 22) = 9.84, p = .005, η2 = .31, indicating greater bias in the no control 
salient condition (M = 6.27; SE = 0.15) than in the control salient condition (M = 5.65; SE = 
0.11).   
Discussion 
In Study 1 we found that people for whom lack of control was salient demonstrated 
increased ingroup bias, presumably in an attempt to restore or maintain a sense of global 
control through the self by investing in a self-defining group. This initially supports the model 
of group-based control (see Figure 1, Path a). The results further indicate that effects of 
control salience on ingroup bias previously demonstrated in the context of death (Fritsche et 
al., 2008) can be generalized across different domains of potential threat to people’s sense of 
global control. In the following studies we aimed at replicating the effect of control salience 
on ingroup support and defense and at specifying its boundary conditions.   
Study 2 
In Study 2, we wanted to test whether the effect of control salience is independent of a 
possible effect of uncertainty. Uncertainty in relation to the self has been found to increase 
ingroup bias in previous research by Hogg (2007) and Van den Bos (2009). At the same time, 
in everyday life, perceived uncertainty should often be negatively correlated with perceptions 
of control (Baker & Stephenson, 2000) although, conceptually, both constructs are 
independent (i.e. a person who is low in perceived control can at the same time be absolutely 
certain about herself and someone who perceives having a lot of influence on his environment 
can be uncertain about who he really is). Thus, establishing control as a novel explanation of 
ingroup bias requires demonstrating that the proposed effects of control operate independent 
of self-concept uncertainty. We thus manipulated both control salience and self-concept 
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uncertainty/certainty salience in one orthogonal design, testing competing hypotheses. In case 
the effects of control are just a special case of uncertainty salience effects, we expected an 
interaction of both factors, indicating increased ingroup bias following control threat only 
when uncertainty threat is high but not when certainty is made salient. Instead, independent 
main effects of control and uncertainty salience had to be expected if we were right in 
suggesting that control threats work independently of uncertainty/certainty salience.  
Furthermore, we were interested in exploring the role salient intergroup cooperation 
plays in control salience effects on ingroup bias. According to the model of group-based 
control, people who experience threat to control are expected to support their ingroup. 
However, ingroup bias means to support one’s own group at the expense of an outgroup 
which is not always necessary for – or may even oppose – the goal of ingroup support. If 
intergroup cooperation is salient then ingroup bias may not be the appropriate way to bolster 
the ingroup. Therefore, salient intergroup cooperation might reduce the effect of threat on 
ingroup bias. We tested this in the context of the categorization into East vs. West Germans. 
The study took place in November 2009, close to the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin 
wall which is known as the most prominent symbol for the fraternization of East and West 
Germans and the German re-unification which followed less than one year later. In advance to 
this anniversary broad media coverage in Germany had pushed the remembrance of these 
historic events in public. This should have made cooperation between East and West Germans 
salient, at least for some people. Thus, we measured people’s subjective awareness of the fall 
of the Berlin wall and explored whether this would reduce the proposed effects of control and 
uncertainty on East-West ingroup bias.   
Method 
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Participants and Design. Sixty-three women and 30 men with an average age of 21.20 
(SD = 2.27) who could be clearly classified as East (n = 73) or West (n = 20) Germans6 were 
recruited at the campus of an East German university in early November 2009. Participants 
received a chocolate bar as compensation. We had to exclude one person from the final 
sample who indicated having participated in about 20 similar studies during the last six 
months, one person who explicitly refused to judge East and West Germans comparatively, 
and nine people who had some idea about the true purpose of the study (indicating that it was 
on investigating threat/anxiety or the relation between threat and intergroup judgments)7. 
Eighty-two participants remained in the final sample. 
The study had a 2 (high control salient / low control salient) x 2 (uncertainty salient / 
certainty salient) x (awareness of the fall of the wall) design with ingroup bias, ingroup 
identification, and perception of ingroup entitativity as dependent variables.   
Procedure and Materials. All participants agreed to participate in a survey study on 
societal problems and social perception. Participants were given perspective-taking 
instructions similar to those used in Study 1 and then read four paragraphs about Stefan 
Müller, a young male academic suffering long-term unemployment. The overall story strongly 
resembled the case report from Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned one of four 
different versions. Similar to Study 1, in the low control condition it was explained that the 
protagonist had been laid off, whereas in the high control condition he was described as 
having quit the job due to personal reasons.  
For the manipulation of uncertainty salience it was stressed in the uncertainty 
condition that the target’s departure from his last job had been related to uncertainty about 
whether his personality would fit with the job. Furthermore, it was described that after 
                                                
6
 The participants in this study were taken from a larger sample of 115 people of which 22 persons could not be 
classified unambiguously as East or West Germans (because they had been living at the place of their birth for 
less than 15 years or had indicated Berlin as the place of their birth without specifying the part of Berlin). 
7
 In the weeks before this investigation some other studies on similar topics had taken place on campus. This 
might explain the comparatively high number of people who guessed the true purpose of the study.  
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becoming unemployed the target “did not know who he was and what his strengths and 
weaknesses were. His own image about his person was faded and blurred. He always 
wondered about his abilities and his competences.” In the certainty condition the target’s 
departure from his last job had nothing to do with his abilities or competencies and it was 
stated that “he was still certain about who he actually was and what his strengths and 
weaknesses were. Being unemployed did not change his own image about his person which 
still remained clear and distinct.” 
After reading the text participants responded to a set of items that assessed the success 
of the control salience and uncertainty salience manipulations. Participants were asked to 
indicate how well different statements described what they would feel if they were in the 
same situation as Stefan Müller. In this study all ratings were made on seven-point scales 
ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”). To measure perceptions of control we used 
the same four items from Study 1, but reworded to take the first-person perspective, α = .70. 
Perceptions of uncertainty were measured by five items: “How much are you puzzled about 
your strengths and weaknesses?”, “How much does this situation make you uncertain?”, 
“How much did your own image of yourself began to sway?”, “How much did you feel 
uncertain about your own identity?”, and “How much do you have your doubts about your 
own person?”, α = .87.     
After a filler questionnaire identical to that used in Study 1 we explained that even 20 
years after the fall of the Berlin wall there still might be differences between East and West 
Germans and asked the participants to complete ratings of East and West Germans8. They 
rated East (α = .88) and West Germans (α = .81) (presented in counterbalanced order) on ten 
positive traits: “Honest”, “competitive”, “competent”, “likeable”, “determined”, “good-
                                                
8
 Before completing the ingroup bias measure the participants worked on five and a seven item measures of 
ingroup identification and entitativity. For these measures no significant effects of the independent variables 
occurred, all ps > .05. 
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natured”, “ambitious”, “warm”, “trustworthy”, and “independent”. We computed a composite 
ingroup bias score by subtracting outgroup ratings from ingroup ratings.  
Finally, we collected socio-demographic data and before debriefing, thanking, and 
releasing participants we asked participants how much they were “aware of the events of the 
fall of the wall” on a seven-point scale (from 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “very much”).  
Results 
Manipulation Check. Independent 2 (high control/low control salient) x 2 (high 
uncertainty/low uncertainty salient) ANOVAs for the manipulation check measures of control 
and uncertainty revealed that the manipulations were successful. For the measure of control 
the only main effect we found was an effect of the control manipulation, F(1, 78) = 12.52, p < 
.001, η2 = .14; perceptions of control were higher in the high control (M = 4.41; SD = 0.97; n 
= 46) compared to the low control (M = 3.76; SD = 0.81, n = 36) condition. The manipulation 
of uncertainty/certainty did not have a main effect on measured control, F(1, 78) = 0.29, p = 
.59, η2 = .004, and the interaction of control and uncertainty salience was not significant, F(1, 
78) = 2.94, p = .09, η2 = .04.   
For the measure of uncertainty the only effect was a main effect of the uncertainty 
salience manipulation, F(1, 78) = 4.33, p = .04, η2 = .05, all other effects ps > .41. Perceptions 
of uncertainty were increased in the uncertainty salience (M = 4.50; SD = 1.33; n = 42) 
compared to the certainty salience (M = 3.89; SD = 1.34; n = 40) condition. The measures of 
control and uncertainty were not correlated, p > .24. 
Main Analysis. We used multiple regression analysis with interaction tests (Aiken & 
West, 1991) including control salience (-1 = low control; +1 = high control), uncertainty 
salience (-1 = certainty; +1 uncertainty), and the awareness of the fall of the Berlin wall 
(centered), as well as all possible two-way and three-way interactions of these variables as 
predictors of ingroup bias. After eliminating outliers (studentized residuals < -2.0) 77 
participants remained in the analysis.   
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The analysis revealed no main effects, all ps > .15, but a two-way interaction of 
control salience and awareness, b = .08, t(76) = 2.14, p = .04, β = .26. Simple slope analyses 
indicate that for those participants who were not very much aware of the fall of the wall (-1 
SD), the salience of low control increased ingroup bias, b = -.19, t(76) = -2.04, p = .046, β = -
.35,  however, no effect of control salience occurred when awareness was high (+1 SD), b = 
.09, t(76) = 0.97, p = .33, β = .16. For uncertainty salience, a similar pattern was observed. 
We found a two-way interaction of uncertainty and awareness of the historic events, b = -.09, 
t(76) = -2.48, p = .02, β = -.29. Uncertainty increased ingroup bias when awareness was low, 
b = .20, t(76) = 2.11, p = .04, β = .37, but had no effect when awareness was high, b = -.12, 
t(76) = -1.38, p = .17, β = -.23. No other interaction effects were observed, all ps > .22. Both 
interactions are displayed in Figure 2. 
Discussion 
In Study 2 we replicated the findings of Study 1 showing that lack of control salience 
increased ingroup bias in East- and West Germans as the model of group-based control 
suggests (see Figure 1, Path a). Furthermore, we were able to demonstrate that the effect of 
control salience was independent of a parallel effect of uncertainty salience. As predicted by 
uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg, 2007), ingroup bias was increased following reminders of 
uncertainty. Both threats to control and threats of uncertainty seem to affect ingroup bias but 
they do not interact. This renders an alternative – uncertainty based – explanation of control 
salience effects on ingroup bias unlikely. If the control salience effects were due to the fact 
that lack of control may have increased uncertainty, an interaction would have been expected. 
Specifically, the effects of control salience should have been reduced when certainty was 
made salient.  
To preclude the possibility that the independent effect of control salience may have 
been due to increased self-concept uncertainty as a consequence of threatened personal 
control, it is important to check whether the experimental manipulation of personal control 
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elicited uncertainty. Supporting the independence assumption manipulation checks revealed 
that the control manipulation had an effect on perceived control but did not affect ratings of 
uncertainty. Thus, the independent effect of control salience supports the notion that threats to 
personal control can elicit defensive collective reactions which can not be attributed to the 
effects of self-concept uncertainty. 
The effects of control salience and uncertainty salience were both moderated by 
participants’ awareness of the fall of the wall twenty years ago. The salience of cooperation 
between groups (in this case between East and West Germans) ameliorated the adverse effects 
of control and uncertainty-related threats on ingroup bias. This sheds some light on the 
conditions under which ethnocentric reactions to threat may result in the relative devaluation 
of outgroups. In line with the notions of group-based control, supporting the ingroup is of 
primary importance under conditions of threat. Relative outgroup derogation might just be 
one means among others to increase ingroup welfare, and then only sometimes. Our data 
support this view: When people reflected on intergroup cooperation, derogating the 
cooperating outgroup would not have been in the service of ingroup welfare but instead, may 
have hampered ingroup goal pursuit. Thus, under conditions of salient cooperation people did 
not increase ingroup bias as a response to threat.  
As a second – related – possible explanation of the moderating effect of awareness of 
the fall of the wall is that the historic events may have triggered a common ingroup for East 
and West Germans. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) have illustrated that re-categorizing ingroup 
and outgroup on the level of a superordinate, common ingroup improves intergroup attitudes 
and Giannakakis and Fritsche (in press) recently added that the salience of a common ingroup 
ameliorated the adverse effect of personal threat on bias in outgroup evaluation. Thus, 
awareness of the fall of the Berlin wall might have eliminated the effects of threat by making 
the common national ingroup salient. It is up to future research to determine the relative 
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impact that perceived intergroup cooperation and perceptions of a common ingroup may have 
on threat effects on intergroup attitudes.  
Study 3 
Study 3 aimed to replicate the basic effect of control salience on ingroup bias 
demonstrated in Studies 1 and 2. Whereas in the two previous studies salience of control was 
manipulated in the context of unemployment threat, we now aimed to manipulate perceptions 
of control it in a context-free manner. Furthermore, we wanted to replace the perspective-
taking paradigm with an activation of idiosyncratic memories of uncontrollability. We also 
changed the intergroup context from intra-national to international, gathering field data at the 
European Football Championship in Austria and Switzerland 2008 (EURO 2008). In this 
special context intergroup relations and national identity should be particularly salient and 
important at least for some of those people who watch the international matches and cheer 
their national team. However, others might be less identified and are just attracted by the high 
publicity of the event of an international tournament of prime public and media attention. 
Following the model of group-based control, salient lack of control should only increase 
ingroup bias for those who were highly identified with their nation during the tournament 
(See Figure 1, Path b).  
We asked Austrians, Croatians, and Germans on public places in the cities in which 
the matches of their national teams had taken place either to list those aspects of their life that 
made them feel most influential and powerful (high control salience) or those that made them 
feel least influential and most powerless (low control salience). After the manipulation of 
control salience they were asked to evaluate all three nations. At the end of the questionnaire, 
they indicated the extent to which they identified with their own nation during the 
tournament. We hypothesized that for people who were highly identified with their nation, 
being reminded of low (vs. high) control in their life would increase national ingroup bias in 
intergroup evaluations.  
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Gathering data in the field increases the amount of contextual influences which may 
distort the data, such as intergroup dynamics at the tournament  which are likely to affect 
attitudes towards national groups. Specifically, positive results in recent matches may increase 
ingroup bias whereas negative results may decrease it. To account for those possible 
influences and to contrast these influences with the hypothesized effect of personal control 
threat we also included the last match result (positive or negative) as a further independent 
variable.  
Method 
Participants and Design. We approached 123 Austrians, 57 Croatians, and 120 
Germans (88 women, 209 men, three did not indicate their gender) with a mean age of 27.98 
(SD = 8.96) at public places (e.g., fan sites) in the cities of Vienna, Klagenfurt, and Salzburg. 
Participants agreed to take part in a study on “beliefs and attitudes of Austrians, Germans, and 
Croatians at the EURO 2008”. In the three cities, the matches of the Austrian, Croatian, and 
German national teams had taken place and we conducted our study one or two days after 
each match. The three national teams were part of one qualifying group of which only the best 
two out of four teams entered the finals. As compensation participants had the opportunity to 
be entered in a raffle of one of seven vouchers (6 x EUR 25; 1 x EUR 30) for an electronic 
book store. We excluded 20 people from the analyses who did not remember the result of the 
last match of their national team correctly and additional 22 people due to missing data on 
ingroup identification scores. The final sample consisted of 105 Austrians, 49 Croatians, and 
104 Germans (75 women, 181 men, 2 with no gender indicated) in the age of M = 28.07 (SD 
= 8.99).   
We employed a three-factorial design with control salience (high/low personal control 
salient), national ingroup identification at the EURO 2008, and whether the result of the last 
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match was positive (won or tie9) or negative (lost) as independent variables and national 
ingroup bias as dependent variable.  
Procedure. Each participant received a questionnaire in her or his own language10. 
After reading a brief introduction and indicating socio-demographic information participants 
were exposed to the manipulation of control salience. Half of the participants were asked to 
“take some moments and think about those aspects of your life that give you a sense of own 
power over and influence on the important things in your life. Please briefly describe in your 
own words those three aspects of your life that make you feel most powerful.”11 (high control 
salient). The other half received similar instructions but were asked to think about aspects that 
gave them a sense of lacking own power and influence and to indicate the aspects that made 
them least powerful (low control salient)12.   
Then participants were asked some delay questions about the last match of their 
national team and had to indicate this match’s result.  After the delay questions participants 
were instructed to rate typical Austrians, Germans, and Croates each on a set of 15 attributes. 
Five of these items were related to competence (competent, self-confident, independent, 
competitive, intelligent) and four items concerned warmth (tolerant, warm, good-natured, 
honest; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Then we added six items that represented positive 
and negative (recoded) attributes that might be considered stereotypical for one of the three 
nations. These were “connectedness to homeland” (heimatverbunden), “valuing academic 
titles” (titelversessen), “achievement-oriented”, “self-opinionated”, “open”, and “stubborn”. 
                                                
9
 The only match that resulted in a tie was Austria vs. Poland that was celebrated among Austrians as an 
unexpectedly positive result. It saved the Austrian team from dropping out of the tournament after the second 
match. 
10
 Austrians and Germans share German as their national language and thus received questionnaires in German 
language. Croatian participants received questionnaires in Croatian language which had been translated from 
German by a bi-lingual speaker.  
11
 We used the expression “power over the important things in your life” instead of “control” as in German 
everyday language the latter term sounds rather artificial and uncommon. However, please note, that the term 
“power” is used here as a synonym for “control” as it explicitly refers to objects of control that are not 
necessarily social.     
12
 To avoid any contamination of the salience manipulations we did not include manipulation check measures in 
this study. However, analyzing the texts participants generated did not indicate any deviation from the 
instructions. 
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For each item participants indicated on a seven-point scale how well (1 = not at all; 7 = very 
much) it described each of the three nations (α = .75 for Austrian targets, α = .82 for Croatian 
targets, α = .80 for German targets). We computed a composite measure of ingroup bias by 
subtracting the mean of all outgroup ratings from the mean of ingroup ratings.  
National identification served as independent variable. Participants had to answer 15 
delay questions about the tournament and their national team after the experimental 
manipulation before identification was measured. Accordingly, it was unaffected by our 
manipulation (p = .38). As the measure of identification, they were asked to indicate on 
seven-point scales how much they rejected (1 = strongly reject) or agreed with (7 = strongly 
agree) the following statements: “During the EURO 2008 I am identified with the Austrians” 
and “During the EURO 2008 nothing connects me with the Austrians” (recoded; Austrian 
version; nation replaced with the respective ingroup in the other versions, r(256) = .42; p < 
.001).  
After returning the questionnaire to the experimenter, all participants were thanked, 
fully debriefed, and dismissed.  
Results 
We submitted ingroup bias scores to a multiple regression analysis with interaction 
tests (Aiken & West, 1991) including control salience (-1 = high; +1 low control salient), 
ingroup identification (centered), and last match result (-1 = negative; +1 positive) as well as 
all possible interaction terms as predictors13. As a result, we found a main effect of ingroup 
identification, b = .12, t(240) = 3.88, p < .001, β = .25, indicating that ingroup identification 
was positively associated with ingroup bias. As expected, we found an interaction of control 
salience and ingroup identification, b = -.07, t(240) = -2.15, p = .03, β = -.14. Simple slope 
analyses revealed that the salience of low (vs. high) control increased ingroup bias for 
participants who were highly identified (+ 1 SD), b = -.14, t(240) = -2.19, p = .03, β = -.20, 
                                                
13
 We had to exclude 4 participants with missing values on ingroup bias and 13 outliers with studentized 
residuals exceeding 2 or being lower than -2. 
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but not for those who were less strongly identified (- 1 SD), b = .05, t(240) = 0.82, p = .41, β 
= .07 (see Figure 3). From a different angle, ingroup identification increased ingroup bias 
only when low personal control was salient, b = .19, t(240) = 4.40, p <.001, β = .39, but not 
when people were reminded of high control, b = .05, t(240) = 1.18, p = .24, β = .11. No other 
effects were significant, all ps > .31. 
Discussion 
Supporting the model of group-based control we replicated the finding that lack of 
control salience increases ingroup bias in Study 3. This result supports the generalization of 
the findings of Studies 1 and 2 as in Study 3 we used a context-free manipulation of control 
salience and a different intergroup context. Furthermore, we found evidence for the 
moderating role of ingroup identification. National ingroup bias was only increased as a 
consequence of salient lack of control when participants identified highly with their nation in 
the context of the EURO 2008. This is consistent with the model of group-based control that 
proposes ethnocentric responses to control threat only when the respective groups have 
situational or personal significance for defining the social self (see Figure 1, Path b). As is 
also indicated by the results of Study 2, public events that make specific identities more (e.g., 
international sports competition) or less (e.g., fall of the wall anniversary) salient may affect 
group-based control processes, at least for some people. 
We found no indication that specific tournament dynamics, such as the last match 
result, did reliably affect bias over and above the impact of ingroup identification. This may 
hint to the comparatively low impact situational dynamics have on national team support 
compared to trans-situational identities or personal motives such as the need for control. 
However, considering just the result of the last match may not have been sufficient to tap into 
the sometimes complex dynamics of an international football tournament, warranting further 
research on this issue.    
Study 4 
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After demonstrating that personal control threat leads people to engage in support of 
their ingroup, we now turn to the interplay of personal and collective threat in determining 
ethnocentric reactions. It is proposed in the model of group-based control that people use 
group membership for efforts of restoring a global sense of control because they apply 
heuristics of ingroup homogeneity and agency. But what happens if these basic ingroup 
properties are threatened, for instance when people learn that ingroup members do not agree 
upon important values or do not act in a concerted manner? We hypothesize that threat to 
these central group properties exaggerates ethnocentric responses to personal control threat 
(see Figure 1, Path c). Specifically, people might be inclined to re-establish ingroup 
homogeneity and agency via ingroup support and defense, particularly when their own control 
is threatened. For instance, people may align their actions with ingroup norms, influence 
others to do the same, or act to pursue ingroup goals. More indirectly, ingroup homogeneity 
and agency might also be improved subjectively by favoring ingroups and derogating 
outgroups. This may increase the perception of the ingroup as a homogeneous unit via 
processes of social comparison: Intragroup differences appear smaller when the overall 
difference of the ingroup to an outgroup increases (meta-contrast principle; Turner et al., 
1987). Furthermore, ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation may increase the perceived 
legitimacy of ingroup relative to outgroup goal striving (Esses et al., 1998).  
In Studies 4 and 5 we investigated the interplay of personal and collective threat to 
control in affecting ethnocentric responses. In Study 4 we investigated perceived intragroup 
homogeneity as a central precursor of effective collective action and thus collective control. 
We tested the hypothesis that threat to ingroup homogeneity on global values increases 
ethnocentric responses to personal control threat. Furthermore, we aimed at extending the 
previous studies by using a different manipulation of control salience and assessing ingroup 
support and defense in the context of artificial groups, created in the lab.  
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We manipulated the salience of control by asking participants either to write about 
their death (low control), self-determined death, or dental pain. Then we introduced the bogus 
categories of visual and analytic information processors and, on the basis of a fake test, 
assigned all participants to the former group. As a manipulation of threat to ingroup 
homogeneity participants learned either that within their group agreement upon important 
values was low (i.e., strong intra-group variation of approval ratings) or high (i.e., intra-group 
consistency in approval ratings). Then all participants were asked to evaluate both the ingroup 
(visual processors) and the outgroup (analytic processors) on attributes of warmth and 
competence.  
Method 
Sample and Design. Eighty-one men and 132 women with a mean age of 22.95 (SD = 
3.86) participated in a computer-based study on “visual perception and personal values” in a 
laboratory at a German university campus. As compensation they could choose between a 
chocolate bar or a EUR 2 coffee voucher. For the analyses we excluded 21 participants who 
did “not at all” believe that the values we introduced to manipulate homogeneity threat would 
be of some importance. The remaining sample comprised 192 participants.  
We used a 3 (uncontrolled death/self-determined death/dental pain salient) x 2 
(threat/no threat to ingroup homogeneity) design with group evaluations on both warmth and 
competence attributes as dependent variables.        
Procedure. Participants worked on a computer-based experiment. After some general 
instructions and socio-demographic questions we introduced the artificial groups. Participants 
were explained that people can be distinguished on the ground of two basic cognitive 
processing styles resulting in a group of visual processors and a group of analytical 
processors. Participants were told that these two groups would not differ with regard to 
competence and size but that processing style is indicative of a variety of personal preferences 
from strategies of problem solving to choice of occupation or life plans. Then, participants 
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worked on a bogus test of processing style that required them to decide which of eight 
different figures matched four briefly presented comparison objects. All participants were told 
that they belonged to the group of visual processors.   
Then participants were asked to work on an electronic “value and opinion 
questionnaire”. Utilizing a procedure by Fritsche et al. (2008), participants were asked to 
write down their thoughts and emotions with regard to a specific possible event, which served 
as a manipulation of control salience. In the lack of control condition, participants were asked 
to imagine that they died due to an infectious disease. In the partial control condition, they 
were asked to imagine that their death was self-determined as a consequence of committing 
suicide after having been infected with a fatal disease. In a neutral control condition, they 
were asked to write about suffering dental pain. Fritsche et al. (2008, Study 5) have 
demonstrated the effectiveness of this manipulation in increasing control motivation in the 
pure death condition compared to both the self-determined death and the dental pain 
condition. To provide a delay following the manipulation of control salience, participants 
worked on a German version of the 20-item PANAS (Watson et al., 1988; Krohne et al., 
1996)14 and five questions about sleep and wakening patterns. 
Next participants completed a manipulation of ingroup homogeneity threat. First, 
participants worked on a bogus test that was said to measure the endorsement of general goals 
of human behavior on four basic value dimensions, which were named “interactive norm 
orientation”, “philanthropic ideals”, “perspective transcending values”, and “consequence-
based basic orientation”. We used fictitious value labels to be able to give bogus feedback on 
individual values and to avoid processes of self-affirmation (Steele, 1988) that may have 
distorted the results. In this test, participants were presented two Rorschach-type figures and 
were asked ten questions about prevalent associations (e.g., suitability as a family coat of 
arms or as a symbol for a health-care organization). After finishing the test, they received 
                                                
14
 Mood was not affected by the manipulations, all ps > .65. Thus, effects on the dependent variables cannot be 
attributed to affect.    
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detailed information about their individual test results and about how approval ratings for 
each score were distributed in the ingroup of visual processors. These distributions were 
presented as distribution plots on a four-point scale from 1 (is not strived for) to 4 (is strived 
for) with additional written information. The mean values of all four distributions were quite 
close to the alleged individual test score and were always in the positive half of the scale. In 
the homogeneity threat condition the distributions were quite flat with only about 30 to 40 % 
of people sharing the same individual score, indicating high variation in approval ratings 
among ingroup members. In the no threat condition, distributions were quite slim with more 
than 90 % of people sharing the same individual score. To check for the effectiveness of the 
manipulation after each distribution plot we asked participants to indicate how well they 
would be able to infer how much another person approved of the respective value when the 
only information about that person is her or his membership in the ingroup of visual 
processors (on six-point scales from 1 = not at all to 6 = very much), α = .64. 
 As a second – more distal – manipulation check variable we measured perceptions of 
ingroup entitativity on five items (seven-point scales from 1 = “does not apply at all” to 7 = 
“does fully apply”), for instance, “The people in my information processing group share a 
common nature”, “People in my information processing group form a similar and 
homogeneous group”, or “The people of my group share common goals and a common fate”, 
α = .8415.  
We measured group evaluations on the warmth and competence dimensions by asking 
participants to indicate the extent to which they thought four different attributes would 
describe each group. Two of the four items measured ascriptions of warmth (“warm”, “good-
natured”) and two measured ascriptions of competence (“intelligent”, “competent”). Order of 
ingroup and outgroup measures was counterbalanced. On a ten-point scale from 1 (not at all) 
                                                
15
 For exploratory purposes we also measured perceived ingroup ties on five items as one dimension of social 
identification proposed by Cameron (2004). However, as this variable was neither affected by the manipulations 
nor did it affect the dependent variables, we did not include it for further analyses. 
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to 10 (absolutely) participants responded to the item “Probably, visual [analytic] processors 
are … [attribute]”, α = .82 for outgroup warmth, α = .81 for ingroup warmth, α = .75 for 
outgroup competence, α = .82 for ingroup competence16.  
After participants had finished the experiment they were fully debriefed, thanked, and 
released.   
Results 
We manipulated control salience in three different conditions. In accordance with 
Fritsche and colleagues (2008) we conceptualized the uncontrolled death salience condition as 
representing salient lack of global control and the other two conditions to represent lower 
levels of control threat. We therefore tested a (2, -1, -1) contrast. Contrast coded control 
salience and homogeneity threat (-1, 1) were entered in multiple regression analyses with 
interaction tests. In parallel analyses we replaced the critical (2, -1, -1) contrast for control 
salience with the orthogonal (0, 1, -1) contrast to test for possible unexpected differences 
between the self-determined death and the neutral control condition. We will report these 
analyses only in cases where the latter contrast variable was significant. For all cell values see 
Table 1.  
Manipulation check. The manipulation of ingroup homogeneity was successful. We 
entered the manipulation check measure as the criterion in a multiple regression analysis with 
control salience, homogeneity threat, and the interaction of both factors as predictors. We 
found a main effect of homogeneity threat, b = -.30, t(171) = -4.65, p < .001, β = -.34; 
homogeneity threat decreased perceptions of ingroup homogeneity. No other effects were 
significant, all ps > .61. 
As a more distal indicator of the success of the homogeneity threat manipulation we 
submitted scores of perceived ingroup entitativity to an identical analysis, revealing a main 
                                                
16
 We used these specific scales as dependent variables instead of a composite index of ingroup bias. We did so 
as we expected the specific design of Study 5 to prevent effects on some of the evaluations. We come back to 
this in the Discussion section. 
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effect of homogeneity threat, b = -.25, t(171) = -2.87, p = .005, β = -.22, which decreased 
perceptions of entitativity. No other effects were significant, all ps > .3617.  
Main analysis. We conducted analyses for warmth and competence ratings of the 
ingroup and outgroup, separately. This was indicated by the result of a previous 3 
(uncontrolled death/self-determined death/dental pain salient) x 2 (threat/no threat to 
homogeneity) x 2 (ingroup/outgroup ratings) x 2 (warmth/competence ratings) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measurement on the last two factors, revealing a four-way interaction, 
F(2, 166) = 3.29, p = .04, η2 = .04. No other effects involving one of the experimental factors 
occurred, all ps > .1218. 
Separate regression analyses for all mean ratings showed no effects for competence 
ratings of ingroup or outgroup, all ps > .34, which was in line with expectations as 
participants had been told that there would be no intergroup differences on competence. 
However, as expected, we found a significant interaction of control salience (2 -1 -1) and 
homogeneity threat for warmth ratings of the outgroup, b = -.17, t(171) = -2.21, p = .03, β = -
.17. Lack of control salience decreased outgroup ratings when homogeneity threat was high, b 
= -.27, t(171) = -2.41, p = .02, β = -.27, but not when it was low, b = .07, t(171) = 0.65, p = 
.52, β = .07. From a different perspective, homogeneity threat decreased outgroup evaluations 
when participants had been reminded of uncontrollable death, b = -.48, t(171) = -2.64, p = 
.009, β = -.33, but not when they were made to think of self-determined death or dental pain, 
b = .03, t(171) = 0.02, p = .85, β = .02. A parallel analysis for replacing the control salience 
contrast with the orthogonal contrast revealed no significant effects (all ps > .09). No effect 
occurred for warmth ratings of the ingroup. 
                                                
17
 Note, that an independent analysis including the orthogonal (0 1 -1) contrast for control salience revealed a 
significant interaction of control salience and homogeneity threat, b = .25, t(171) = 2.34, p = .02, β = .18. It 
indicates that whereas homogeneity threat decreased perceived entitativity in the neutral control group, b = -.39, 
t(171) = -3.88, p < .001, β = -.35, it did less so in the self-determined death condition, b = -.17, t(171) = -1.64, p 
= .10, β = -.15, approaching significance. No significant (0 1 -1) contrast effects were observed in simple slope 
analyses for the conditions of high or low homogeneity threat, all ps > .08. 
18
 A previous analysis including order of ingroup and outgroup ratings as a factor showed that order did not 
affect the reported four-way interaction, F(2, 160) = 0.02, p = .98, η2 = .00.  
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Discussion 
Perceived threat to collective agency exaggerated people’s ethnocentric response to 
threatened personal control. Specifically, when ingroup homogeneity on basic social values  
was threatened reminding participants of uncontrollable death decreased the evaluation of the 
outgroup compared to when participants were reminded of self-determined death or dental 
pain. This pattern is in line with the model of group-based control and the idea that intragroup 
homogeneity on values lays the foundation for perceived collective agency. People who 
perceive their sense of personal control to be fundamentally shaken react to threatened 
collective homogeneity with particularly strong defenses, because these people need 
homogeneous – and thus agentic – ingroups most. 
 
In Study 4 only outgroup evaluations on the warmth dimension were influenced by the 
manipulations. However, ingroup evaluations or evaluations on competence were not 
affected. This was not surprising and most likely due to the specific constraints in the 
experimental situation. Here, we told people that both processing styles were equally effective 
and thus we did not expect any effect on competence ratings. The result that warmth ratings 
were only affected with regard to the outgroup but not the ingroup might go back to the fact 
that participants had received information about ingroup (but not outgroup) warmth 
beforehand as we gave the information that within the ingroup basic moral values were shared 
(the reported means were always clearly positive). No information was provided about the 
outgroup. Obviously, warmth evaluations of the outgroup were the only aspect which has not 
been set fixed in the instructions. Therefore, group-based control restoration effects could 
have only been expressed on warmth evaluations of the outgroup.  
Study 5 
Study 5 served the conceptual replication of the finding from Study 4 that collective 
threat moderated the effects of personal control salience on ingroup support and defense. 
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Whereas we focused on threat to ingroup homogeneity in Study 4 we extended our focus to 
both ingroup agency and homogeneity as group features that both indicate ingroup entitativity 
(Brewer et al., 2004) and that should both be important for group-based control (see Figure 1, 
Path c). The present study took place in the context of natural groups and we used global 
manipulations of ingroup threat and threat to personal control.  
We asked members of a human-rights volunteer organization to think either of aspects 
of their organization indicating high homogeneity and agency (low threat to ingroup 
entitativity), low homogeneity and agency (high threat), or neither high nor low expressions 
of ingroup entitativity (neutral group). Salience of either high or low personal control was 
manipulated in the same manner as in Study 3. Afterwards, as a measure of ingroup support 
we asked people to indicate their intentions to perform pro-organizational behaviors of 
different levels of difficulty. As previous research indicates that threat to control might only 
affect pro-organizational behavior that does not entail high risk of failure (Fritsche et al., 
2008, Study 6) we measured ingroup support on three different levels of difficulty (low, 
medium, high).  
Methods 
Sample and Design. We recruited 121 volunteer members (76 women; 44 men; one 
person did not indicate gender) of a non-governmental, worldwide operating human-rights 
organization at local and trans-local meetings of this organization in Germany. Participants’ 
mean age was 28.89 (SD = 13.67). Eighty participants were university students, three were 
attending high school, 22 were employed, and 13 people did not match any of these 
categories. On average, they had been members of the organization for six (SD = 9.5) years. 
We excluded nine participants who did not fill out the manipulation tasks, resulting in a final 
sample of 112 participants. 
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The study had a 2 (high/low personal control salient) x 3 (entitativity threat 
high/neutral/entitativity threat low) x 3 (easy/medium/difficult pro-organizational behavior) 
mixed design with repeated measurement on the last factor.  
Procedure. All participants were randomly assigned one of six versions of a 
questionnaire that was introduced as a study on personality and attitudes towards the human 
rights organization they were member of. First, participants were asked to write about some of 
their own thoughts about their local human rights group, which served the manipulation of 
threat to ingroup entitativity. In the high threat condition, participants were first asked to 
write down the aspects that accounted for differences between individual members of the 
organization (threat to ingroup homogeneity) and then to describe how the individual 
members of their group would pursue his/her purely individual goals (threat to ingroup 
agency). In the low threat condition, participants were asked to write about agreement and 
similarity among group members (low threat to ingroup homogeneity) and then about how the 
group as a whole pursues its goals (low threat to ingroup agency). In a neutral condition, 
participants were first instructed to write down spontaneous associations that came to their 
mind when they were thinking of their group. Then, they were asked to describe the rooms in 
which their local group had its regular meetings. 
We manipulated the salience of low or high personal control by using a task which 
was very similar to the one used in Study 3. We either asked participants to write about the 
aspects of their lives that gave them a sense of powerlessness or lacking influence over their 
own actions and the important things in their life (low personal control salient) or to write 
about aspects of their lives that gave them high power and influence (high personal control 
salient). After that we administered the 20-item PANAS and 13 items on sleep and wakening 
patterns, to provide a delay (see previous studies). 
Then, we measured intentions of pro-organizational behavior by asking participants to 
indicate how much they would agree with each of 15 intention statements (on a scale from 1 = 
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“do not agree at all” to 5 = “fully agree”). Five of these statements described behaviors that 
had been rated by experts as comparatively easy (e.g., signing a petition), some were of 
medium difficulty (e.g., preparing specific campaign materials), and some were quite difficult 
to perform (e.g., becoming the speaker for the group).  
Before finishing the questionnaire participants were asked to give some socio-
demographic information. Then they were thanked, fully debriefed, and dismissed.  
Results 
A 2 (high/low personal control salient) x 3 (entitativity threat high/neutral/entitativity 
threat low) x 3 (easy/medium/difficult pro-organizational behavior) mixed factor ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of difficulty of pro-organizational behavior, F(2, 212) = 274.69, p < 
.001, η2 = .72. Confirming our initial classification of pro-organizational behaviors, easy 
behaviors (M = 3.06; SD = 0.66) were rated as more likely in the future than medium 
behaviors (M = 2.09; SD = 0.84) and difficult behaviors (M = 1.47; SD = 0.92) were rated less 
likely than medium behaviors (all ps < .001). The only other significant result was a quadratic 
three-way interaction, F(2, 106) = 3.77, p = .03, η2 = .07, all other ps > .08. To decompose the 
interaction we conducted separate 2 (high/low personal control salient) x 3 (entitativity threat 
high/neutral/entitativity threat low) ANOVAs for easy, medium, and difficult pro-
organizational behavior. For cell values see Table 2. 
For pro-organizational behavior of medium difficulty, we found the predicted two-way 
interaction of control salience and entitativity threat, F(2, 106) = 4.22, p = .02, η2 = .07 (all 
other ps > .22). Salient lack of control increased pro-organizational behavior when entitativity 
threat was high, F(1, 106) = 7.18, p = .009, η2 = .06, but not when it was neutral, F(1, 106) = 
1.43, p = .23, η2 = .01, or low, F(1, 106) = 0.08, p = .78, η2 < .01. From a different angle, 
entitativity threat increased pro-organizational behavior only when low personal control, F(2, 
106) = 4.94, p = .009, η2 = .09, but not when high personal control was salient, F(2, 106) = 
0.45, p = .64, η2 < .01. Specifically, simple comparisons showed that pro-organizational 
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behavior was increased in the entitativity threat condition compared to both the neutral (p = 
.003) and the low threat condition (p = .01).  
For behaviors of high and low difficulty we did not find any significant effects (all ps 
> .10), with one exception. For behaviors of low difficulty, the predicted interaction effect of 
control salience and entitativity threat was approaching significance, F(2, 106) = 2.99, p = 
.055, η2 = .05. The descriptive pattern of this interaction was similar to what we found for 
medium behaviors: As a trend, lack of control salience increased pro-organizational behavior 
only when entitativity threat was high, F(1, 106) = 3.72, p = .056, η2 = .03, but not when it 
was neutral, F(1, 106) = 1.40, p = .24, η2 = .01, or low, F(1, 106) = 0.91, p = .34, η2 < .01. 
Looked at differently, entitativity threat seemed to affect behavior intentions only when 
people were reminded of low control, F(2, 106) = 2.63, p = .08, η2 = .05, but not when they 
were made to think about high control, F(2, 106) = 0.64, p = .53, η2 = .01. Specifically, when 
low control was salient entitativity threat increased pro-organizational behavior compared to 
the neutral (p = .03) and the low threat condition (p = .056).   
Discussion 
In Study 5 we tested whether threat to ingroup entitativity (homogeneity and agency) 
moderates the effects of personal control threat on ingroup support which is proposed in the 
model of group-based control (see Figure 1, Path c). We conceptually replicated and extended 
the findings of Study 4. Following a global threat to personal control participants increased 
pro-organizational behavior that was of low or medium difficulty when at the same time 
threat to ingroup entitativity was salient. The effect of personal control salience did not occur 
when high entitativity was salient or when entitativity was not made salient at all. In other 
words, participants only then increased ingroup support as a response to personal control 
threat when the control restoring properties of the group seemed to be at stake. This directly 
supports the idea that ingroup support is functional for preserving the collective sources of 
control. 
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The data of Studies 4 and 5 also speak to the literature on the effects of collective 
threat (Branscombe, 1999; Riek et al., 2006). It seems that collective threat only then 
increases ethnocentric behavior when personal needs are activated that increase the subjective 
importance of the group. Obviously, the concurrence of personal and collective threats lays 
the ground for a strong ethnocentric response. However, this response does not necessarily 
target only ingroup bias or outgroup derogation (Study 4) but may also entail direct ingroup 
support (Study 5).  
Interestingly, personal threat to control did not increase ingroup support and defense, 
when ingroup homogeneity or agency were salient (Studies 4 and 5). It seems that making 
salient membership in a highly entitative ingroup was sufficient to protect people from the 
adverse consequences threat to personal control can have. This is consistent with previous 
research on uncontrollable or self-determined death, showing that uncontrollable death led 
people to ascribe higher homogeneity to the ingroup (Fritsche et al., 2008). The same 
reasoning may explain the missing of any effect of personal control threat in the condition in 
which entitativity has not been made salient. Although in this condition, instead of writing 
about ingroup entitativity participants wrote down general associations they had with their 
human rights organization, the mere salience of this ingroup may have enhanced participants’ 
sense of being member of a highly entitative group. This is because political action groups are 
per se likely to be considered highly entitative as they are task groups founded for the mere 
purpose to act collectively towards a shared goal (see Lickel, Hamilton & Sherman, 2001). 
In Study 5 control threat only increased pro-organizational behaviors of medium and, 
as a tendency, low difficulty. Possibly, this is due to a floor effect for highly difficult 
behaviors. Also, one may speculate that under conditions of control threat people avoid efforts 
with a high risk of failure as failing on these tasks would confirm a state of personal 
helplessness (see Fritsche et al., 2008; Pittman, 1998).  
General Discussion 
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Five studies provide converging evidence for specific effects of control threat on 
ingroup support and defense and therefore support a novel model of group-based control. We 
found that the salience of low control increased ingroup serving reactions such as ingroup bias 
(Studies 1 - 3), outgroup derogation (Study 4) and pro-organizational behavior (Study 5). This 
supports our basic assumption that people increasingly act in terms of group membership 
when their sense of global personal control is threatened (see Figure 1, Path a). It appears that, 
acting as a group member functions to restore or to maintain their sense of global control as 
heuristically, groups appear as unitary actors (Brewer et al., 2004).   
However, people only show collective reactions to personal control threat when the 
respective ingroup represents their self, which we demonstrated in Study 3 (Path b). This 
stresses the view that thinking and acting in terms of group membership aims to restore 
control through the (social) self. That is, it seems that people cling more strongly to their 
ingroups under conditions of personal control threat because the ingroup represents the self 
(rather than because other group members may be expected to assist the individual in 
attaining her or his personal goals).  
The present findings also speak to previous research by Kay and colleagues (Kay et 
al., 2008, 2009, 2010) as well as Rutjens and Loseman (2010). These authors have proposed 
that threat to personal control may elicit tendencies towards indiscriminate system 
justification and approval of external agents of control, such as God. They assumed that 
people react in that manner in order to reestablish a sense of order and certainty, thus striving 
for the perception that, if not themselves, some other, external, agent may control the world. 
Our findings suggest a different perspective on how people respond to personal control threat 
which may complement the insights by the authors mentioned above. Increased favoritism for 
ingroups vs. outgroups after threat to personal control and the moderation of this effect by 
ingroup identification indicate that people under personal control threat may not want the 
world to be controlled by just anybody but that they have a strong preference that the agent 
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who controls the world is their own (social) self. This is consistent with explications of a 
basic motive of control (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Pittman & Zeigler, 2007; Skinner, 1996) which 
is primarily about exerting control through the self and not about control exerted by some 
external (see Rotter, 1966) force. 
Probably, the effects of control threat (Fritsche et al., 2008; Kay et al., 2008, 2009, 
2010; Rutjens & Loseman, 2010) are driven by both the motivation to control the world 
through the self and the motivation to render the world predictable and non-chaotic (see 
Pittman, 1998). This is because in everyday life perceptions of lacking control have the 
potential to increase both uncertainty and threat to control. In Study 2 we took a first step to 
differentiate the effects of uncertainty and control threat and found evidence that both motives 
work in parallel, but independent of one another.  
Threat to self-esteem has also been proposed to motivate defensive intergroup 
cognition (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). As perceptions of personal 
control are positively correlated with self-esteem (Judge, Erez, Bono & Thoresen, 2002) the 
present control threat effects might be explained in terms of threatened self-esteem. However, 
empirical evidence speaks against this possibility. First, the salience of low personal control 
seems to increase ingroup support irrespective of whether control referred to positive or 
negative self-related outcomes. In Studies 1, 2, and 4, under both high and low control 
salience conditions the final outcome (suffering long-term unemployment; being dead) was 
kept constant (i.e. negative). Nevertheless ethnocentric responses were increased in the lack of 
control condition. Second, studies on the effects of control threat manipulations in the context 
of death salience (Study 4) have not detected any effect on explicit or implicit state self-
esteem (Fritsche et al., 2008; Fritsche, Du, Talati et al., 2012). Third, in more recent studies 
by Fritsche et al. (2012) the effects of uncontrollable death turned out to be most pronounced 
in people chronically low on internal control beliefs but were not moderated by explicit or 
implicit personal self-esteem.  
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The Interplay of Personal and Collective Threat  
Threat to collective homogeneity (Study 4) and agency (Study 5) catalyzed the effect 
of personal control threat on ingroup support and defense (Path c). This supports our 
assumption that heuristic beliefs about groups as unitary actors are essential for group-
membership restoring perceptions of control. When these group properties are threatened, 
people who perceive low personal control increase ingroup support and defense in order to 
protect the group and to demonstrate ingroup agency.  
This complements previous research on the detrimental consequences of collective 
threat on intergroup relations (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Riek et 
al., 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). It has been found that both symbolic and realistic threat 
to a group can increase prejudice against outgroups. The present findings highlight personal 
threat as a possible moderator of these effects. This stresses the role of individual motives for 
the explanation of collective threat effects (see Correll & Park, 2005).  
In the present studies we found increased ingroup defense following threat to both 
personal and collective control. However, it is an interesting question if threat to collective 
homogeneity and agency can also lead people who are deprived of personal control to 
distance from the group. Research on the consequences of collective threat has demonstrated 
distancing in lowly identified group members (Spears et al., 1997) and when people had a 
chance to switch to a non-threatened group (Ellemers et al., 1988). We may speculate that a 
sense of global control can be restored by referring to one of many different possible 
incarnations of the self (Turner et al., 1987). If control restoration on the personal level of the 
self seems futile (as it might have been the case in the present experiments where participants 
were not given the opportunity to restore perceptions of personal control) people may cling to 
one of various possible self-definitions on the group level. Given that two or more social self-
categories are equally salient in a situation and people are equally identified with each of the 
groups, they may prefer self-definition in terms of a non-threatened group and distance from a 
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threatened ingroup under conditions of personal threat. In terms of group-based control, 
perceptions of lacking personal control may lead people to distance from a seemingly non-
homogeneous and non-agentic ingroup when an alternative self-category is salient that is of at 
least similar subjective centrality for defining the self.  
Nevertheless, in everyday life, collective self-definition is often determined by the 
actual social context (e.g., watching a football match of the own national team or having been 
diagnosed a visual instead of an analytical processing style) and there are chronic differences 
in people’s identification with different ingroups (e.g., people who are highly identified with 
their own human rights group but less so with their neighborhood). Thus, simply “switching” 
to an alternative group identity when the presently focused ingroup turns out to be lacking 
control seems neither to be easy nor common in the course of everyday cognition. Therefore, 
and in accordance with the data of Studies 4 and 5, instead of distancing from the ingroup, the 
combination of threat to personal and collective control will often result in exaggerated levels 
of ingroup support and defense.  
Conclusion 
Thinking and acting as a group member can free people from the limitations of control 
they may recognize as individuals. It also may pave the way to more formalized collective 
action or social movement participation which has been shown to be an identity driven 
process (Stürmer & Simon, 2004). This is how symbolic control restoration via group 
membership may indirectly foster social processes that can actually lead to self-serving 
changes in the environment. However, as the downside of these processes group-based 
control can result in increased levels of ethnocentrism and outgroup derogation.      
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Table 1 
Group evaluations on warmth and competence attributes (1-10), manipulation check scores 
(MC; 1-6) and perceived ingroup entitativity (1-7) as a function of control salience and threat 
to ingroup homogeneity (Study 4): M (SD). 
 
 Uncontrolled death 
salient 
Self-determined death 
salient 
Dental pain salient 
 Threat to 
Homo-
geneity 
No threat Threat to 
Homo-
geneity 
No threat Threat to 
Homo-
geneity 
No threat 
Outgroup  
warmth 
4.83 (1.39) 5.79 (1.43) 5.25 (1.41) 5.68 (1.69) 6.04 (1.45) 5.50 (1.24) 
Ingroup 
warmth 
7.27 (1.54) 7.53 (1.27) 7.33 (0.97) 7.34 (1.38) 7.10 (1.38) 7.21 (1.38) 
Outgroup 
competence 
7.20 (1.11) 7.28 (1.48) 7.04 (1.10) 7.05 (1.85) 7.00 (1.23) 7.50 (1.40) 
Ingroup 
competence 
6.72 (1.10) 7.02 (1.38) 6.90 (0.97) 6.90 (1.62) 6.96 (1.22) 6.79 (1.00) 
MC Homo-
geneity 
3.87 (0.85) 4.45 (0.96) 3.83 (0.67) 4.40 (0.86) 3.74 (0.82) 4.42 (0.85) 
Entitativity 2.89 (1.12) 3.59 (1.18) 3.41 (0.71) 3.30 (1.14) 2.89 (1.21) 3.78 (1.10) 
N 30 34 24 31 24 29 
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Table 2 
Pro-organizational behavior (1-5) of low, medium, and high difficulty as a function of control 
salience and threat to ingroup entitativity (Study 5): M (SD). 
 
 Low personal control salient High personal control salient 
 Entitativity 
threat high 
Neutral 
condition 
Entitativity 
threat low 
Entitativity 
threat high 
Neutral 
condition 
Entitativity 
threat low 
Low 
difficulty 
3.39 (0.56) 2.91 (0.74) 2.93 (0.52) 2.93 (0.90) 3.14 (0.55) 3.16 (0.52) 
Medium 
difficulty 
2.71 (0.99) 1.89 (0.77) 1.97 (0.89) 1.93 (0.81) 2.17 (0.76) 2.05 (0.74) 
High 
difficulty 
1.76 (1.06) 1.35 (0.99) 1.22 (0.77) 1.76 (1.06) 1.49 (0.84) 1.33 (0.74) 
N 14 25 18 18 23 14 
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Figure 1 
Predictions derived from the model of group-based control. 
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of control 
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Figure 2 
Ingroup bias (from –6 to +6) as a function of control salience, uncertainty salience, and 
awareness of the fall of the wall (Study 2). 
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Figure 3 
Ingroup bias (from -6 to +6) as a function of control salience and ingroup identification 
(Study 3). 
 
 
 
